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INTRODUCTION
As the Supreme Court of Canada recognized in R v Gladue, the estrangement of Canada’s
Indigenous peoples from the Canadian justice system is a national crisis—a crisis of which
overincarceration is merely one symptom.1 This reality has been emphasized by scholars such
Of the Ontario Bar; Assistant Professor, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University. Thanks to Jaclyn
Salter and Elizabeth Taylor for research assistance and to Jocelyn Stacey, Camden Hutchinson, Candice
Telfer, Li-Wen Lin, and Naiomi Metallic for comments on a draft.
1.	
R v Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688, 171 DLR (4th) 385 [Gladue]. See, for example, Gladue at paras 61 (“the
excessive imprisonment of aboriginal people is only the tip of the iceberg insofar as the estrangement of
the aboriginal peoples from the Canadian criminal justice system is concerned”) and 64 (“These findings
cry out for recognition of the magnitude and gravity of the problem, and for responses to alleviate it. The
figures are stark and reflect what may fairly be termed a crisis in the Canadian criminal justice system.”)
*	
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as Larry Chartrand, who in 2001 wrote that “This [overincarceration] is not disputed and is
supported by countless national and provincial commissions and inquiries” and attributed it
in part to “systemic discrimination in the justice system.”2 Similarly, James (Sákéj) Youngblood
Henderson emphasizes the roots of this crisis in colonization, noting that “More than two
decades of commissions, inquiries, reports, special initiatives, conferences and books have
established the totalizing effects of colonization on Aboriginal peoples in Canada.”3
Indeed, the justice system reinforces the adverse impacts of colonization. Henderson
puts it clearly:
Indigenous peoples know this crisis more as feeling than as theory. They have
to build their lives around injustices and pollution that they cannot heal,
undermining their lives and dignity. In the context of a failed justice system
that we do not control, we are struggling to free our minds and our peoples
from the worst manifestations of the Eurocentric colonial context.4
Likewise, Chartrand observes that “To be a member of a Nation of people who have been
humiliated, discriminated against, abused and victimized by England and Canada is deeply
disconcerting.”5 Despite Gladue and its progeny, Chartrand argues that “in the case of claims
by Aboriginal peoples for justice the Supreme Court of Canada has largely been a source of
injustice.”6 Chartrand also demonstrates “blatant ignorance on the part of the government of
Canada” as to the impact of the criminal law on Indigenous persons.7 These problems are often
met with weak and insufficient responses. Indeed, in her study of colonization and the justice
system, Lisa Monchalin dismisses Gladue, and the provision of the Criminal Code underlying
it, as mere “tinkering.”8
In the wake of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the legal profession and its
regulators have focused on the training and education of lawyers and law students, particularly
in “intercultural competency,” as emphasized in Calls to Action 27 and 28.9 For example,
in 2018 the Advocates’ Society, the Indigenous Bar Association, and the Law Society of Ontario
jointly published a Guide for Lawyers Working with Indigenous Peoples, which observed—

Larry N Chartrand, “Aboriginal Peoples and Mandatory Sentencing” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall LJ 449 at
454, 457 [Chartrand, “Mandatory Sentencing”].

2.	

James (Sákéj) Youngblood Henderson, “Postcolonial Indigenous Legal Consciousness” (2002) 1 Indigenous
LJ 1 at 24 [citations omitted].

3.	

Ibid at 24 [citations omitted].

4.	

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Calls to Action (Winnipeg: The Commission, 2015),
online: National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation <nctr.ca/reports.php>. Call to Action 27: “We
call upon the Federation of Law Societies of Canada to ensure that lawyers receive appropriate cultural
competency training, which includes the history and legacy of residential schools, the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Treaties and Aboriginal rights, Indigenous law, and
Aboriginal–Crown relations. This will require skills-based training in intercultural competency, conflict
resolution, human rights, and anti-racism.” Call to Action 28: “We call upon law schools in Canada to
require all law students to take a course in Aboriginal people and the law, which includes the history and
legacy of residential schools, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Treaties
and Aboriginal rights, Indigenous law, and Aboriginal–Crown relations. This will require skills-based
training in intercultural competency, conflict resolution, human rights, and anti-racism.”

9.	
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among other things—that “there is no such thing as a culturally neutral practice of law.”10
However, this training and education focus is important but incomplete: The journey toward
reconciliation will also involve law societies’ re-examination of their relationship with and
regulation of Indigenous lawyers.
A key facet of the regulation of Indigenous lawyers is the disciplinary process, including
the determination of penalties. It is in this respect that the applicability of Gladue principles
warrants consideration.
In the twenty years since Gladue, Gladue principles have been extended well beyond
their origin in criminal sentencing.11 However, there have been only two matters in which
these principles have been explicitly applied by professional discipline tribunals—both in
disciplining lawyers.12 Neither of these decisions were judicially reviewed, which means no
court has stated whether or not this extension is appropriate. Moreover, these discipline
decisions are not considered in the leading treatise on lawyer discipline.13 As a result, there is
doctrinal uncertainty.
In this article, I address this doctrinal uncertainty by analyzing these disciplinary decisions
and tracing the appellate extensions of Gladue that preceded them and the decisions of
Advocates’ Society, Indigenous Bar Association & Law Society of Ontario, Guide for Lawyers Working
with Indigenous Peoples (Toronto: AS, IBA & LSO, 2018) at 10, online: <https://lawsocietyontario.
azureedge.net/media/lso/media/legacy/pdf/g/guide_for_lawyers_working_with_indigenous_peoples_
may16.pdf>.

10.	

Criminal Code, supra note 8, s 718.2(e). I also note statutory extensions of Gladue to sentencing regimes
outside the Criminal Code. See, for example, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make
related and consequential amendments to other Acts, SC 2019, c 15, s 63(23), adding subsection c.1 to s
203.3 of the Code of Service Discipline, being Part III of the National Defence Act, RSC 1985, c N-5: “all
available punishments, other than imprisonment and detention, that are reasonable in the circumstances
and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders,
with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.” (However, this was first read in by
Pelletier J in R v Levi-Gould, 2016 CM 4003 at para 13. Thanks to Benjamin Ralston for bringing this
case to my attention.) See also Youth Criminal Justice Act, SC 2002, c 1 [YCJA], s 38(2)(d): “all available
sanctions other than custody that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all young
persons, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal young persons,” which was missing
from the predecessor Young Offenders Act, RSC 1985, c Y-1. The presence of this provision in the YCJA is
less a true extension of Gladue than merely avoiding a legislative gap between the YCJA and the Criminal
Code. See Kent Roach & Jonathan Rudin, “Gladue: The Judicial and Political Reception of a Promising
Decision” (2000) 42 Can J Criminology 355 at 357: “More troubling, the federal government initially
decided not to include an equivalent of s 718.2(e) in its proposed Youth Criminal Justice Act. This would
have produced the absurd result that judges would have had more legal resources to avoid placing adult
rather than teenaged aboriginal offenders in jail.”

11.	

While I would distinguish police discipline from professional discipline, in this respect see Commissaire à
la déontologie policière v Ross, 2003 CanLII 57332 (QC CDP) at para 330, in which the decision maker
seemed to hold that Gladue principles apply but was not specific about how. At the penalty hearing
the police officers argued that Gladue principles should apply to penalty determination (Police Ethics
Commissioner v Ross, 2003 CanLII 57340 at para 24 (QC CDP): “This is a case involving ‘native’ police
officers and ‘native’ civilians in a ‘native’ community with unique experiences with law enforcement. The
Committee can look to Gladue, a judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada, for sentencing principles
in matters dealing with aboriginal peoples”) but it is unclear whether and how the decision maker took
Gladue principles into account.

12.	

Gavin MacKenzie, Lawyers & Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Discipline (Toronto: Thomson
Reuters Canada 1993) (loose-leaf updated 2019, release 4) at ch 26, 26.17 at 26-42 to 26-62.

13.	
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the Supreme Court of Canada that followed them to determine whether these disciplinary
decisions were correct in applying Gladue principles.
However, despite the spread of Gladue principles, there are no settled legal criteria or legal
tests for when Gladue principles should be extended beyond the context of criminal sentencing.
Thus, to demonstrate that Gladue principles properly apply to lawyer discipline, I must
first establish a legal test for the extension of Gladue principles to new contexts. I identify
four possible approaches to the extension of Gladue principles. Three of these approaches
are identifiable in the decisions of appellate courts, while the fourth can be derived from a
common theme among some of these decisions. Of these four approaches, two would apply
to all discipline of Indigenous lawyers and one would apply depending on the nature of the
particular conduct at issue. I ultimately conclude that while appellate guidance is desirable to
confirm which of these four approaches, alone or in combination, is correct, Gladue principles
should generally be applied to discipline of Indigenous lawyers.
This article is organized in three parts. I begin in Part I with an analysis of the reasons
given in these lawyer disciplinary decisions, set within the context of background information
on Indigenous lawyers in Canada and the purposes of law society discipline. Then, in Part II,
I trace the extension of Gladue principles from the Criminal Code through to these disciplinary
decisions to identify my four approaches to when Gladue principles should be extended to
contexts outside criminal sentencing. I also consider the impact of decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada subsequent to these disciplinary decisions. In Part III, I consider how these
four approaches interact and explain why Gladue principles should generally be applied to the
discipline of Indigenous lawyers.
As a starting point, it is important to crystallize the meaning of the phrase “Gladue
principles.” While the Supreme Court of Canada often refers to “Gladue principles,”14
suggesting that the phrase is a term of art, less often does it define what precisely those
principles are or mean. As my analysis below will demonstrate, this ambiguity about what
exactly Gladue principles are informs ambiguity about how they apply in contexts beyond
criminal sentencing.
The Supreme Court of Canada in R v Ipeelee held that
Gladue directs sentencing judges to consider: (1) the unique systemic and
background factors which may have played a part in bringing the particular
Aboriginal offender before the courts; and (2) the types of sentencing
procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the circumstances
for the offender because of his or her particular Aboriginal heritage
or connection.15
(In addition, the court held that “the Gladue principles direct sentencing judges to abandon
the presumption that all offenders and all communities share the same values when it comes to
sentencing and to recognize that, given these fundamentally different world views, different or
alternative sanctions may more effectively achieve the objectives of sentencing in a particular

See, for example, R v Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13 [Ipeelee] at paras 34, 63, 64, 74, 84, 87; R v Kokopenace, 2015
SCC 28 at para 98, rev’g 2013 ONCA 389 [Kokopenace SCC, Kokopenace CA].

14.	

Ipeelee, supra note 14 at para 72, citing Gladue, supra note 1 at para 66.

15.	
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community.”16) The court in Gladue specified, among these unique factors, that “many
aboriginal people are victims of systemic and direct discrimination, many suffer the legacy of
dislocation, and many are substantially affected by poor social and economic conditions.”17
Similarly, the court in Ipeelee, quoting from the Report of the Manitoba Public Inquiry into
the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People, referred to “cultural oppression, social
inequality, the loss of self-government and systemic discrimination, which are the legacy of the
Canadian government’s treatment of Aboriginal people.”18 Chartrand likewise states that “the
inclusion of section 718.2(e) in the Criminal Code and the special direction given to sentencing
judges to consider the unique circumstances of Aboriginal peoples is a response and an
acknowledgment by government that Aboriginal crime is not simply a question of individual
circumstances but rather the result of complex social factors.”19
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Kokopenace used the phrase “Gladue
principles” interchangeably with “the estrangement of Aboriginal peoples from the criminal
justice system.”20 This usage is consistent with the reasons in Gladue, which emphasized not
only overincarceration but also “the greater problem of aboriginal alienation from the criminal
justice system.”21
Thus, for my purposes, Gladue principles may be described as a recognition of the unique
circumstances of Indigenous persons, particularly their alienation from the criminal justice
system, and the impact of discrimination, cultural oppression, dislocation, and poor social and
economic conditions.

I

INDIGENOUS LAWYERS, LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND
GLADUE PRINCIPLES

In this section I analyze the reasoning in the two lawyer disciplinary decisions that have
applied Gladue principles, as well as a third decision in which the panel acknowledged
that Gladue principles could apply but declined to do so. I start, however, by considering
the situations and experiences of Indigenous lawyers in Canada and then by setting out the
purposes of law society discipline and the factors going to penalty.

A.

Indigenous Lawyers in Canada
Ipeelee, supra note 14 at para 74.

16.	

Gladue, supra note 1 at para 68. See also Marie Manikis, “Towards Accountability and Fairness for
Aboriginal People: The Recognition of Gladue as a Principle of Fundamental Justice That Applies to
Prosecutors” (2016) 21:1 Can Crim L Rev 173 at 183, defining Gladue as “the principle that requires
public agencies to take into account the status of Aboriginal people and their backgrounds when making
decisions that can affect their liberty interests.” See also Manikis at 184: “the Gladue principle entails that
special consideration is attributed to Aboriginal status in every decision by a state agency that has the
potential effect of undermining an Aboriginal person’s life, liberty or security interests.”

17.	

Ipeelee, supra note 14 at para 83, quoting Manitoba, Public Inquiry into the Administration of Justice and
Aboriginal People, Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, vol 1, The Justice System and
Aboriginal People (Winnipeg: The Inquiry, 1991) at 86.

18.	

Chartrand, “Mandatory Sentencing,” supra note 2 at 462–463 [emphasis added].

19.	

Kokopenace SCC, supra note 14 at para 97.

20.	

Gladue, supra note 1 at para 65.

21.	
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A 2016 study reported that Indigenous lawyers comprise approximately 1 percent of
the legal profession in Canada,22 but there is considerable variation among the provinces.
According to recent statistics from the Law Society of Ontario, Indigenous lawyers comprise
roughly 1.5 percent of the Ontario bar, which is about half of their proportion in the general
population.23 Indigenous lawyers comprise about 0.5 percent of the Quebec bar24 and about
5.5 percent of the Manitoba bar.25 (Similarly, Indigenous lawyers as a proportion of the legal
profession by province varied from a low of 0.4 percent in Quebec to a high of 4.9 percent in
Saskatchewan as of 2006.26)
As Sonia Lawrence and Signa Daum Shanks have noted, “the number of Indigenous
lawyers [in Canada] doubled at some point in the 1990s.”27 Similarly, a 2009 report from the
Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC) concluded that “the Aboriginal bar in Ontario consists
of mostly recently called lawyers…approximately 65% of self-identifying Aboriginal lawyers
have been called since 2001.”28
As several commentators recognize, Indigenous lawyers may face a challenge in reconciling
their Indigeneity with their status as legal professionals “given the centrality of the Canadian
legal system in the ongoing oppression of Indigenous Canadians.”29 As Lawrence and Daum

Canadian Centre for Diversity and Inclusion, Diversity by the Numbers: The Legal Profession (Calgary
and Toronto: CCDI, 2016) at 27, online: <https://ccdi.ca/media/2019/dbtn_tlp_2016.pdf> [1.06 percent].
According to figures from Tennant, in 1992 Indigenous lawyers made up 0.8 percent of the legal profession,
which was approximately one-third of their proportion of the general population (2.3 percent): Chris
Tennant, “Discrimination in the Legal Profession, Codes of Professional Conduct and the Duty of NonDiscrimination” (1992) 15:2 Dal LJ 464 at 469 [citation omitted].

22.	

Law Society of Ontario, Statistical Snapshot of Lawyers in Ontario (Toronto: LSO, 2017) at 2, Table 1
(1.5 percent and 2.8 percent), online: <http://annualreport.lso.ca/2017/common/documents/SnapshotLawyers18_English.pdf> [LSO Snapshot].

23.	

Barreau du Québec, Rapport annuel 2018–2019 (Montréal: Barreau du Québec, 2019) at 13, online:
<https://www.barreau.qc.ca/media/1885/2018-2019-rapport-annuel.pdf> [134 of 27,581 (0.5 percent)].

24.	

Law Society of Manitoba, 2019 Annual Report (Winnipeg: LSM, 2019) at 8, online: <http://www.
lawsociety.mb.ca/Plone/publications/annual-reports/2019%20Annual%20Report.pdf/view> [114 of 2094
(5.4 percent)].

25.	

Michael Ornstein, Racialization and Gender of Lawyers in Ontario (Toronto: LSUC, 2010) at 16, Table 11,
online: <https://lawsocietyontario.azureedge.net/media/lso/media/legacy/pdf/r/racialization_gender_report.
pdf>. The three territories reported a pooled proportion of 13.7 percent, but that figure combined both
Indigenous and racialized lawyers. On the need for better demographic data, see Sabrina Lyon & Lorne
Sossin, “Data and Diversity in the Canadian Justice Community” (2014) 11 JL & Equality 85.

26.	

Sonia Lawrence & Signa A Daum Shanks, “Indigenous Lawyers in Canada: Identity, Professionalization,
Law” (2015) 38:2 Dal LJ 503 at 504. See also Law Society of Upper Canada, Final Report—Aboriginal Bar
Consultation (Toronto: LSUC, 2009) at paras 1–3, online: <https://lawsocietyontario.azureedge.net/media/
lso/media/legacy/2009-final-report-of-the-indigenous-bar-consultation_1.pdf> [LSUC ABC Report].

27.	

LSUC ABC Report, supra note 27 at para 37.

28.	

Lawrence & Daum Shanks, supra note 27 at 513. See also Patricia A Monture, “Now That the Door Is
Open: First Nations and the Law School Experience” (1990) 15:2 Queen’s LJ 179 at 189: “The work
of Canadian legal scholars, the judiciary, politicians, and in fact all those involved with the shaping of
Canada as a nation state, have actively, by omission or commission, participated in the direct oppression
of First Nations.” See also Jeffrey G Hewitt, “Decolonizing and Indigenizing: Some Considerations for Law
Schools” (2016) 33:1 Windsor YB Access Just 65 at 68: “Law schools produce legal actors and, through
this production line, serve as a site of colonization because in Canada law has been, and continues to be, a
vehicle to oppress Indigenous peoples” [citations omitted].

29.	
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Shanks put it, “Indigenous lawyers occupy a complicated space.”30 Tracey Lindberg describes
this tension in terms of language: “As students of law, Aboriginal people are in the position
of having to learn an unfamiliar language while attempting at the same time to retain their
own.”31 Similarly, Henderson writes that “Indigenous lawyers have had to resist the European
categories and methods and redraw the map and consequences of the law of colonization.”32
He elaborates that “Eurocentrism and colonial thought still imprisons colonized Indigenous
peoples and Indigenous lawyers…[who] seek to practice law, law reform, and empower our
communities and peoples within the toxic parameters of our cognitive prison of our legal
consciousness.”33 (At the same time, that colonized knowledge can be applied for change:
“by using borrowed Eurocentric languages and skills, Indigenous lawyers can participate in
unraveling Eurocentric visions.”34) Indeed, Constance Backhouse argues that “the very concept
of professionalism has been inextricably linked historically to masculinity, whiteness, class
privilege, and Protestantism”—as well as Eurocentric colonization.35
Discrimination is a reality for many Indigenous lawyers and law students. Not surprisingly,
the 2009 LSUC report concluded that discrimination was a major factor in the experience
of Indigenous lawyers in Ontario.36 Similarly, although somewhat dated, a 2000 survey of
Indigenous lawyers by the Law Society of British Columbia found that 76 percent reported
“discriminatory barriers” in law school, as did 81 percent in practice but only 59 percent
while articling.37
While the discrimination faced by Indigenous lawyers shares some elements with racism
generally, the two are not the same. For example, Lawrence and Daum Shanks explain:
Indigeneity should not be conflated with other racializations. But, the ubiquity
of racism directed at Indigenous people and the extent to which this figures in
personal narratives mean that the treatment of Indigenous peoples and nations
by colonial and imperial projects cannot be entirely separated from racial
projects more generally.38

Lawrence & Daum Shanks, supra note 27 at 504–505.

30.	

Tracey Lindberg, “What Do You Call an Indian Woman with a Law Degree? Nine Aboriginal Women
at the University of Saskatchewan College of Law Speak Out” (1997) 9:2 CJWL 301 at 321. See also
305–306: “Many of us recognized that we were being indoctrinated and we fought this indoctrination in
different ways.”

31.	

Henderson, supra note 3 at 9.

32.	

Ibid at 14, 15.

33.	

Ibid at 54.

34.	

Constance Backhouse, “Gender and Race in the Construction of ‘Legal Professionalism’: Historical
Perspectives” in Adam Dodek & Alice Woolley, eds, In Search of the Ethical Lawyer: Stories from the
Canadian Legal Profession (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016) 126 at 128. See also 132–133 on Indigenous
lawyers and prospective lawyers.

35.	

LSUC ABC Report, supra note 27 at para 41. On the experiences of Indigenous law students, see generally
Monture, supra note 29 and Lindberg, supra note 31.

36.	

Law Society of British Columbia, Aboriginal Law Students Working Group, Addressing Discriminatory
Barriers Facing Aboriginal Law Students and Lawyers (Vancouver: LSBC, 2000) at 17, 34-35,
38-39, online: <https://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/Website/media/Shared/docs/publications/reports/
AboriginalReport.pdf>.

37.	

Lawrence & Daum Shanks, supra note 27 at 509.

38.	
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Similarly, the final report of the Challenges Faced by Racialized Licensees Working Group
of the Law Society of Upper Canada noted “that Indigenous peoples face barriers that
are unique to Indigenous licensees and barriers that are shared by both racialized and
Indigenous licensees.”39
In this context, it would not be surprising if at least some Indigenous lawyers have
complicated relationships with and attitudes toward law societies as regulators.40 Little
information is available on the experiences of Indigenous lawyers with law society
investigations and discipline. While there are no statistics that directly suggest Indigenous
lawyers are disciplined at a greater level than lawyers overall, they are more likely than lawyers
overall to practise as sole practitioners (in Ontario, 24 versus 21 percent) or in small firms of
fewer than five lawyers (of those lawyers practising in firms, 42 versus 29 percent)—groups
that are generally considered to be investigated and disciplined at a higher rate than lawyers
in larger firms.41 Of the ten reported penalty decisions over the last twenty years in which the
lawyer is identifiable as Indigenous, the reasons in only the three I will discuss below consider
Gladue principles.42 (As for good character hearings for admission to the bar, of the three
decisions in the last twenty years in which the applicant is identifiable as Indigenous none
considers Gladue principles.43)

Law Society of Upper Canada, Challenges Faced by Racialized Licensees Working Group, Working
Together for Change: Strategies to Address Issues of Systemic Racism in the Legal Professions (Toronto:
LSUC, 2016) at para 18, online: <https://lawsocietyontario.azureedge.net/media/lso/media/legacy/pdf/w/
working-together-for-change-strategies-to-address-issues-of-systemic-racism-in-the-legal-professions-finalreport.pdf>.

39.	

See, for example, Law Society of Ontario v Bogue, 2019 ONLSTA 19 at paras 7–8, where the lawyer
argued that the Law Society Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over Indigenous lawyers, on unceded land, or both.
Consider also the difficult experience of an Indigenous lawyer applicant convincing the LSUC to allow her
to wear traditional regalia for her call to the bar: Duncan McCue, “First Nations Law Student Gets OK
to Wear Regalia to Call to Bar in Ontario” CBC News (22 June 2015), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/
indigenous/first-nations-law-student-gets-ok-to-wear-regalia-to-call-to-bar-in-ontario-1.3123665>.

40.	

LSO Snapshot, supra note 23 at 7, Table 5a, and 8, Table 5b. Again, there is arguably a need for better
data. See note 26 and accompanying text. Better data could quantify the degree to which sole practitioners
and small-firm lawyers are investigated and disciplined and could also reveal whether Indigenous licensees
are being overinvestigated and overdisciplined.

41.	

Law Society of Alberta v Willier, 2018 ABLS 22, [2018] LSDD No 244 [Willier]; Law Society of
Saskatchewan v Winegarden, 2017 SKLSS 8, [2017] LSDD No 262; Law Society of Upper Canada v
Batstone, 2017 ONLSTH 34, [2017] LSDD No 39 [Batstone]; Law Society of Upper Canada v Batstone,
2015 ONLSTH 214, [2015] LSDD No 263; Law Society of Alberta v Mirasty, 2016 ABLS 21, [2016]
LSDD No 109, aff’d 2016 ABLS 58, [2017] LSDD No 135 [Mirasty, Mirasty Appeal]; Law Society of
Alberta v Shanks, 2013 ABLS 21, [2013] LSDD No 214; Law Society of Upper Canada v Terence John
Robinson, 2013 ONLSAP 18, [2013] 4 CNLR 129, [2013] LSDD No 75, var’g 2012 ONLSHP 115, [2012]
LSDD No 130 [LSUC v Robinson AP, LSUC v Robinson HP]; The Law Society of Manitoba v Nadeau,
2013 MBLS 4 [Nadeau]; Law Society of British Columbia v Bauder, 2013 LSBC 7, [2013] LSDD No 17;
Law Society of Alberta v Hendricks, [2005] LSDD No 4. (These are the ten decisions that use terms such
as “Indigenous” or “Aboriginal” or “Métis” or “First Nations.” There may well be additional decisions
regarding Indigenous lawyers in which the lawyer was not identifiable as Indigenous from the reasons.)
See also Law Society of Upper Canada v Harry, 2014 ONLSTH 173, [2014] LSDD No 223, relating to
discipline of an Ontario paralegal, again in which Gladue was not considered.

42.	

Law Society of Upper Canada v Levesque, 2005 CanLII 27007, [2005] LSDD No 38; Law Society of
Upper Canada v Schuchert, [2001] LSDD No 63 (sub nom Schuchert, Re, 2001 CanLII 21499); Moore v
Law Society of British Columbia, 2018 BCSC 1084 [Moore] (the underlying decision is unreported).

43.	

27

(2020) 4:1 Lakehead Law Journal 

B.

Martin

Law Society Discipline: Purpose and Penalty

Law society legislation and codes of professional conduct across the country say little,
if anything, about the purposes of lawyer discipline and the factors that determine penalties.
The legislation does often indicate the purposes of the law society and self-regulation, which
apply to discipline along with all other law society functions, among which most importantly
“the Society has a duty to protect the public interest.” 44 Given this relative silence it is
necessary to turn to disciplinary decisions themselves and case law related to them as relevant
primary sources. In a passage that has been quoted with approval in lawyer disciplinary
decisions in the majority of Canadian jurisdictions, Gavin MacKenzie writes that “the purposes
of law society discipline proceedings are not to punish offenders and exact retribution,
but rather to protect the public, maintain high professional standards, and preserve public
confidence in the legal profession.”45 MacKenzie also refers to “the protective and deterrent
functions of the discipline process.”46 Many aggravating and mitigating factors have been held
to apply to penalty determination. The most detailed list, although explicitly not exhaustive,
has been adopted by the BC Court of Appeal:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

the nature and gravity of the conduct proven;
the age and experience of the respondent;
the previous character of the respondent, including details of prior discipline;
the impact upon the victim;
the advantage gained, or to be gained, by the respondent;
the number of times the offending conduct occurred;
whether the respondent has acknowledged the misconduct and taken steps
to disclose and redress the wrong and the presence or absence of other
mitigating circumstances;
h. the possibility of remediating or rehabilitating the respondent;
i. the impact on the respondent of criminal or other sanctions or penalties;
j. the impact of the proposed penalty on the respondent;
k. the need for specific and general deterrence;
l. the need to ensure the public’s confidence in the integrity of the profession; and
m. the range of penalties imposed in similar cases.47
A similar list has been recognized by the Ontario Divisional Court, of which two factors are in
substance absent from the BC list:

Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8, s 4.2, para 3.

44.	

MacKenzie, supra note 13 at Ch 26, 26.1, p 26-1. See Guttman v Law Society of Manitoba, 2010 MBCA
66 at para 75, 255 Man R (2d) 151; Howe v Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, 2019 NSCA 81 at para 190
[Howe]; Vlug (Re), 2018 LSBC 26 at para 164, [2018] LSDD No 190; Law Society of Upper Canada v
Walton, 2015 ONLSTA 8 at para 29, [2015] LSDD No 41; Law Society of Alberta v Schwartzberg, 2017
ABLS 23, [2017] LSDD No 306; Winegarden, supra note 42 at para 78; Hutton, Re, 2006 CanLII 38726
(NL LS); McNiven (Re), 2016 CanLII 32391 at para 63 (NWT LS). See also Law Society of Upper Canada
v Kazman, 2008 ONLSAP 7 at para 75: “Disciplinary orders are directed toward four main purposes: a)
Specific deterrence; b) General deterrence; c) In appropriate cases, improved competence, rehabilitation and
or restitution; and d) Most important of all, maintaining public confidence in the legal profession.”

45.	

MacKenzie, supra note 13 at Ch 26, 26.1, p 26-1.

46.	

Faminoff v The Law Society of British Columbia, 2017 BCCA 373 at para 36, 4 BCLR (6th) 324.

47.	
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g.	whether there are extenuating circumstances (medical, family-related or others)
that might explain, in whole or in part, the misconduct;
h.	whether the misconduct is out-of-character or, conversely, likely to recur.48
Other than “extenuating circumstances,” there is no explicit reference to the background of
the lawyer or, paraphrasing the words of the court in Gladue, the “factors which may have
played a part in bringing the particular [lawyer] before the [panel].” This absence makes it
unclear where “the unique systemic and background factors” of Indigenous lawyers would
be considered. From these lists, Gladue principles appear primarily relevant to “the need
for specific and general deterrence,” “extenuating circumstances,” possible remediation
or rehabilitation, and “the need to ensure the public’s confidence in the integrity of the
profession,” but, as I will explain below,49 may also be relevant to the lawyer’s character.

C.

Gladue in Lawyer Discipline

The first disciplinary matter in which Gladue principles were applied was Law Society of
Upper Canada v Terence John Robinson.50 The unusual facts in LSUC v Robinson were that
the lawyer enlisted a client to violently attack a non-client. The lawyer, being harassed and
eventually pursued by a non-client who accused the lawyer of an affair with his girlfriend,
contacted a client for assistance in “teach[ing] him a lesson” to end the harassment.51 The client
and a fourth man attacked and seriously wounded the non-client.52 The lawyer pled guilty
to aggravated assault.53 The lawyer argued that his Indigenous background was a mitigating
factor, following Gladue, and more specifically that his “life experiences as an Aboriginal
caused him to be suspicious of police and he therefore felt he was unable to call the police
for assistance.”54 The lawyer admitted the charge of conduct unbecoming and the hearing
panel imposed a two-year suspension.55 The hearing panel equated the lawyer’s conduct to
misappropriation of client funds: “A lawyer’s integrity is the foundation of his practice. The
public must have confidence that when a lawyer is retained he will never steal the client’s trust
funds nor will the lawyer solicit the client to commit a criminal act.”56

D’Mello v The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONSC 5841 at paras 84, 91, 340 OAC 160 (Div Ct).

48.	

See below note 62 and accompanying text.

49.	

LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42. LSUC v Robinson AP is particularly persuasive given its panel,
including two future treasurers (Janet A Leiper and Malcolm M Mercer), a former attorney general
(Marion Boyd), and a highly regarded criminal law specialist (Mark Sandler). (Gladue principles were
invoked in the prior matter of Law Society of Upper Canada v Selwyn Milan McSween, 2012 ONLSAP 3,
[2012] LSDD No 15, but to argue that the principles should be applied to black lawyers.)

50.	

LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42 at para 6, quoting LSUC v Robinson HP, supra note 42 at paras 4–7.

51.	

LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42 at para 6, quoting LSUC v Robinson HP, supra note 42 at paras 8–9.

52.	

LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42 at para 1; LSUC v Robinson HP, supra note 42 at para 2.

53.	

LSUC v Robinson HP, supra note 42 at para 2.

54.	

Ibid at paras 17, 48.

55.	

Ibid at para 44. See similarly LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42 at para 51: “To state the obvious, the act
of enlisting a client to break the law, and to do so violently, is contrary to everything that our profession
stands for.”

56.	

29

(2020) 4:1 Lakehead Law Journal 

Martin

While the hearing panel held that the lawyer’s Indigeneity was not a mitigating factor,
citing “the lack of evidence…or ‘case-specific information,’”57 the appeal panel—holding
that there was such evidence—substituted a lesser suspension of one year.58 The appeal panel
recognized that the professional disciplinary context was different from criminal sentencing—
in particular, “that a licensee’s liberty is not at stake in disciplinary proceedings”—but also
that the Gladue provision of the Criminal Code did not apply, that disciplinary penalties did
“not addres[s] the crisis of over-incarceration of Aboriginal people,” and that the objective of
discipline was to maintain public confidence in the profession.59 However, it held that Gladue
principles applied to disciplinary proceedings, they just applied differently:60
Hearing panels are concerned with the seriousness of misconduct or conduct
unbecoming and circumstances that offer aggravation or mitigation. They are
concerned with the culpability or moral blameworthiness of the licensee, and
any facts that bear on those issues. They are concerned about the character of
the licensee who appears before them. And they are concerned about crafting
dispositions that meet the required objectives while promoting access to justice
for everyone, including of course, the Aboriginal community. The latter is
especially true for the Aboriginal community and others whose access to justice
has been deeply problematic.
None of the above concerns are incompatible with maintaining public
confidence in the legal profession. Indeed, consideration of unique systemic and
background factors, as they reflect upon the seriousness of a licensee’s conduct,
and his or her culpability or moral blameworthiness, is necessary to enhance
respect for, and confidence in our profession and the self-regulation of all
of its members.61
The panel also linked the lawyer’s Indigeneity to good character, observing specifically that “the
systemic racism and discrimination which the appellant overcame to become a lawyer speaks
powerfully about his character.”62 The law society conceded that the panel should consider
“background and systemic factors,” that the lawyer “need not prove a causal connection
between being an Aboriginal person and the subject conduct as long as the background and
systemic factors may have played a role in bringing the offender before the hearing panel,” and
that panels “may take judicial notice of systemic racism and discrimination.”63
The hearing panel did recognize as a mitigating factor that the lawyer provided services to
the underserved Indigenous community:

LSUC v Robinson HP, supra note 42 at para 36, quoting from Ipeelee, supra note 14. See also para
31: “There is absolutely no evidence that the Lawyer was adversely affected because of his mother and
grandmother having been sent away to residential schools as children.”

57.	

LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42 at para 4.

58.	

Ibid at para 73.

59.	

Ibid at para 74.

60.	

Ibid at paras 72–73.

61.	

Ibid at para 55.

62.	

Ibid at para 75.

63.	
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It is evident…that the Lawyer worked diligently for his clients who were
disadvantaged and that he is committed to serving the Aboriginal community.
We know Aboriginal people are over-represented in our justice system. We also
know Aboriginal people face challenges in retaining lawyers. Permitting the
Lawyer to return to practising law may serve to increase access to justice for
the Aboriginal community. The panel is of the opinion that an Aboriginal
lawyer providing legal services to Aboriginal clients will be a benefit to the
public and to the courts.64
The appeal panel agreed on this point, noting that this factor “has relevance to what penalty is
required to maintain confidence in the legal profession.”65
This principle in itself—that a lawyer’s past and future service of an underserved
community, usually a particular ethnic or linguistic community (and typically the lawyer is
a member of the community), is a mitigating factor to penalty—is not necessarily unique to
Indigenous lawyers. For example, it has recently been accepted by the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal as a principle applicable to discipline of “racialized lawyer[s]” generally.66 Moreover,
it can be applied in the discipline of Indigenous lawyers in the absence of Gladue principles.67

LSUC v Robinson HP, supra note 42 at paras 39–41.

64.	

LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42 at para 56.

65.	

Howe, supra note 45 at paras 179 (describing the principle: “when addressing the sanctioning of a
racialized lawyer, it is appropriate to consider the community’s need to have access to lawyers from their
community in the justice system”) and 186–187 (holding it properly applies in Nova Scotia).

66.	

See, for example, Mirasty, supra note 42 at para 131, aff’d Mirasty Appeal, supra note 42 at para 29:
“It is acknowledged that Mr. Mirasty is an aboriginal person, practices in Northern Alberta in the area
of criminal law, and has a unique ability, because of his cultural heritage and his ability to speak Cree,
to provide access to legal services to a geographic and cultural community which is in significant need
of legal assistance and support.” See also Moore, supra note 43 at para 97, reviewing an admissions
decision: “As Ms. Moore notes and I am sure the Law Society would agree, it is also in the public
interest to have practising Indigenous lawyers who can provide culturally appropriate services to clients.
Supporting Indigenous lawyers in the process of becoming admitted to the bar and remaining members
of the bar, whether that is accomplished through future policies or other means, will foster the process of
reconciliation that the Law Society has, on its own initiative, embarked upon.”

67.	
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However, this principle is sometimes contested.68 Consider, for example, the panel in The
Law Society of Manitoba v Nadeau, holding that underserved groups deserve and require
protection against lawyer misconduct just as the general public does:
Being of a particular ancestry, ethnicity, culture or background often creates
a rapport with people having similar traditions or characteristics. We accept
that many of Nadeau’s clients were attracted to him because of his Aboriginal
background.…We know that the Society is concerned that Aboriginal people,
especially those in northern and other remote areas of the Province, are
underserved in having access to legal services. However, the Society and its
discipline panels have the duty and legal obligation to protect all Manitobans,
including those of Aboriginal ancestry, from exposure to dishonest or unethical
acts by lawyers.69
Nonetheless, this aspect of LSUC v Robinson is binding on Ontario hearing panels.
LSUC v Robinson was followed by a subsequent hearing panel in Law Society of Upper
Canada v Batstone.70 The Indigenous lawyer had practised while suspended, but instead of the
presumptive penalty of suspension the panel ordered only a reprimand.71 The panel noted both
that the lawyer “has overcome significant barriers to get where she is” and that she served an
Indigenous clientele.72
While not citing LSUC v Robinson, the panel in Law Society of Alberta v Willier
recognized that Gladue principles could apply to lawyer discipline, though it declined to apply
them on the basis of insufficient evidence.73 What distinguishes Willier from LSUC v Robinson
is that Gladue principles were recognized as potentially applying not only to the penalty but

See, for example, Law Society of Upper Canada v Landry, 2008 ONLSAP 15 at para 23, [2008]
LSDD No 140:

68.	

The Appellant invited the Appeal Panel to give consideration to the specific nature of
the practice (family law) and the clients (members of the Francophone community) in
assessing the hardship and the balance of convenience. It is the view of the Panel that clients
are naturally inconvenienced when lawyers are found to have engaged in professional
misconduct and face suspensions and/or revocation of their licences. The need to regulate
the profession in the public interest necessitates this inconvenience. This is addressed by
ensuring orderly transitions or temporary strategies to minimize the impact on clients. It is
not, however, to be considered as a factor meriting the reduction of a properly determined
penalty.
See also Law Society of Ontario v Nguyen, 2018 ONLSTH 157 at para 84, [2018] LSDD No 236: “The
fact that the Lawyer is one of a very few fluent Vietnamese-speaking lawyers currently practising law in his
community, and that his clients will be deprived of his services if his licence is revoked, cannot affect our
decision in the case of a presumptive penalty of revocation.”
Nadeau, supra note 42.

69.	

Batstone, supra note 42 at paras 10–14.

70.	

Ibid at paras 10–11.

71.	

Ibid at para 13: “She serves a community that is in particular need of her services in a circumstance where
there is a particular need for First Nations lawyers to serve them.”

72.	

Willier, supra note 42 at paras 31 and 35: “we have not been provided with any evidence respecting Mr.
Willier’s personal or family circumstances that would explain, mitigate, or otherwise affect Mr. Willier’s
responsibility for the costs of these proceedings.”

73.	
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also to costs.74 Like in LSUC v Robinson and Batstone, the lawyer’s service to Indigenous
clients, “a traditionally underserviced area of the public,” was cited as a mitigating factor.75
Although not a discipline decision, Gladue principles were also argued on the judicial
review of the admissions decisions of the Credentials Committee in Moore v Law Society of
British Columbia.76 However, Watchuk J held that the failure to consider Gladue principles did
not compromise the reasonableness of the challenged decisions—although noting that the Law
Society could have been more responsive to the applicant.77 Moreover, the reasons in Moore do
not indicate how Gladue factors might have affected the analysis.
In order to determine whether LSUC v Robinson and Batstone were correctly decided—
that is, whether Gladue principles are applicable in lawyer discipline proceedings—it
is necessary to examine the appellate case law to identify and establish the criteria for
the extension of Gladue principles beyond criminal sentencing. It is to this case law
that I turn now.

II

FOUR APPROACHES TO THE EXTENSION OF GLADUE
PRINCIPLES BEYOND CRIMINAL SENTENCING

As Judge Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond noted extra-judicially in 2000, “the reasoning in
the Gladue decision is not of the sort that is narrowly confined to one specific component
of the administration of justice.”78 But despite the spread of Gladue principles, there are no
settled legal criteria or legal tests for when Gladue principles should be extended beyond the
context of criminal sentencing. Likewise, while there is some literature on the application of
Gladue principles to individual contexts outside criminal sentencing, there appears to be little
consideration of, and no clear test proposed for, when those extensions beyond sentencing
are appropriate.79 Jonathan Rudin’s observation in 2008 remains applicable today: “One of
the live questions arising from the [Gladue] decision was the extent to which the decision

Ibid at para 35.

74.	

Ibid at para 15.

75.	

Moore, supra note 43.

76.	

Ibid at para 96.

77.	

Judge ME Turpel-Lafond, “Sentencing within a Restorative Justice Paradigm: Procedural Implications of R.
v. Gladue” (2000) 43 Crim LQ 34:1 at 47–48.

78.	

See, for example, Jillian Rogin, “Gladue and Bail: The Pre-Trial Sentencing of Aboriginal People in
Canada” (2017) 95:2 Can Bar Rev 325; Jonathan Rudin, “The Application of Gladue Principles to
Ontario Review Board Hearings in Theory and Practice” (2012) 33:3 For the Defence 31; Shaunna Kelly,
“Application of Gladue Principles Beyond Sentencing Hearings” (2012) 33:3 For the Defence 34 [on bail
only]; Erin Dann, “United States of America v Leonard: Why Gladue Principles Matter in Extradition”
(2013) 34:3 For the Defence F3. See also Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Arash Nayerahmadi, “Over-Indebted
Criminals in Canada” (2019) 42:4 Manitoba LJ 207, arguing that Gladue principles should apply to victim
surcharges (at 231-232) and fines (at 233); R v Boudreault, 2018 SCC 58 at paras 83, 94. But see Kent
Roach, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Gladue at Ten and in the Courts of Appeal” (2009) 54 Crim
LQ 470 at 499–503. Roach describes several extensions of Gladue but does not take the next step in his
analysis as I do here.

79.	
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could be extended to other areas involving the treatment of Aboriginal offenders by the
justice system.”80
Thus, to determine whether Gladue principles properly apply to lawyer discipline, I must
first establish a legal test for the extension of Gladue principles to new contexts. In this part,
I trace the extension of Gladue principles beyond criminal sentencing by appellate courts to
identify approaches to the extension of Gladue principles. These approaches are candidate
tests, or candidate components of a test, for such extension.
I argue that the case law demonstrates four approaches to when Gladue principles will
apply. The first is an overlapping considerations approach, where the applicable legal test
includes considerations, purposes, or factors that overlap with criminal law sentencing. The
second is an alienation contextual approach, where the alienation of Canada’s Indigenous
peoples from the justice system, and particularly the criminal justice system, is relevant to the
proceeding or the legal test to be applied.81 The third is a liberty interest approach, where the
liberty interest of an Indigenous person is at stake in the proceedings. These three approaches
are expressly evident in the case law I will discuss below, with different ones predominating
in different cases. That is, these first three approaches are ones that the judges appear to
be expressly applying (without stating these are the only or complete approaches, or even
identifying or articulating them as approaches). They apply to categories of cases involving
Indigenous persons, such as all extradition decisions or all bail decisions.
The fourth approach is a criminal conduct approach, where the conduct at issue constitutes
or nears criminal conduct. While this approach is not invoked in the case law, I identify it from
the cases. That is, this fourth approach is a set of commonalities I have identified from these
cases that the court does not seem to explicitly recognize. Outside of proceedings under the
Criminal Code, this fourth approach applies not to entire categories of cases, but on a case-bycase basis depending on the particular facts.
As I will demonstrate from the appellate decisions, these four approaches are partially
overlapping and are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Prior to LSUC v Robinson, Gladue principles had been applied by appellate courts in
review board dispositions of accused found to be not criminally responsible (NCR),82 civil
contempt,83 bail,84 and extradition.85 In this part I examine these decisions to establish my four

Jonathan Rudin, “Aboriginal Over-representation and R v Gladue: Where We Were, Where We Are and
Where We Might Be Going” (2008) 40 SCLR (2d) 687 at 699.

80.	

I acknowledge that following Gladue, addressing this alienation is a purpose of criminal sentencing. I
separate it out for my analysis.

81.	

R v Sim (2005), 78 OR (3d) 183, 201 CCC (3d) 482 (CA), Sharpe JA [Sim]. Sim is discussed in Roach,
supra note 79 at 502–503.

82.	

Frontenac Ventures Co v Ardoch Algonquin First Nation, 2008 ONCA 534, 91 OR (3d) 1 [Frontenac
Ventures]. Frontenac Ventures is discussed in Roach, supra note 79 at 500–501.

83.	

R v Robinson, 2009 ONCA 205, 95 OR (3d) 309 [R v Robinson]. (R v Robinson was recently codified in
Criminal Code, supra note 8, s 493.2: An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act
and other Acts and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, SC 2019, c 25, s 210.)

84.	

United States v Leonard, 2012 ONCA 622, 112 OR (3d) 496, [2012] 4 CNLR 305, Sharpe JA (Doherty JA
dissenting on remedy only) [Leonard].

85.	
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approaches.86 I then consider the impact of two decisions following LSUC v Robinson in which
the Supreme Court of Canada has declined to apply Gladue principles to jury roll composition
and to prosecutorial discretion.87

A.

R v Sim: Review Board NCR Decisions

The first major extension of Gladue principles beyond criminal law sentencing by an
appellate court was R v Sim, in which the Ontario Court of Appeal extended Gladue principles
to review board dispositions of accused found to be NCR. Justice Sharpe, writing for the court,
considered the statutory criteria for the disposition and concluded that Indigeneity was relevant
to these criteria: “proper consideration of appropriate placement of the accused, reintegration
into society and the other needs of the accused will call, where the circumstances warrant,
for the [review board] to advert to the unique circumstances and background of aboriginal
NCR accused.”88 In doing so, Sharpe JA emphasized the alienation aspects of Gladue.89 He
noted that the Supreme Court of Canada in Gladue “suggested that the principles motivating
its decision could have wider ramifications,”90 quoting the Supreme Court’s observation that
alienation from the criminal justice system went beyond sentencing: “It is clear that sentencing
innovation by itself cannot remove the causes of aboriginal offending and the greater problem
of aboriginal alienation from the criminal justice system…There are many aspects of this sad
situation which cannot be addressed in these reasons.”91 Thus, Sharpe JA concluded that “I do
not think that the principles underlying Gladue should be limited to the sentencing process
and I can see no reason to disregard the Gladue principles when assessing the criminal justice
system’s treatment of NCR accused.”92
The reasons of Sharpe JA in Sim explicitly demonstrate the alienation contextual approach.
The liberty interest and criminal conduct approaches, implicit in his reasoning, apply because
the liberty interest of an Indigenous person is engaged and the conduct at issue is criminal
conduct, albeit primarily future criminal conduct. The overlapping purposes approach applies,

I do not consider appellate decisions regarding other aspects of sentencing: parole ineligibility (R v Jensen
(2005), 74 OR (3d) 561, 195 CCC (3d) 14 (CA)), dangerous offender and long-term offender designations
(R v Ladue, 2011 BCCA 101, 271 CCC (3d) 90, [2011] 2 CNLR 277), or the correct court in which to try
a young person (R v MN, 2004 NUCA 2, 354 AR 243). (Jensen and MN are discussed in Roach, supra note
79 at 500–501.) Neither do I consider trial-level judicial reviews of administrative decision makers: see, for
example, parole hearings (Twins v Canada (AG), 2016 FC 537, [2016] 3 CNLR 342 [Twins]) and prisoner
segregation decisions (Hamm v Canada (AG), 2016 ABQB 440, 41 Alta LR (6th) 29). (Thanks to Benjamin
Ralston for bringing Twins and Hamm to my attention.) See also David Milward & Debra Parkes,
“Gladue: Beyond Myth and Towards Implementation in Manitoba” (2011) 35:1 Man LJ 84 at 107, n 117:
“the Correctional Service of Canada [in 2008] has directed that all CSC staff should consider all decisions
affecting Aboriginal persons in custody in accordance with ‘Gladue principles’” [citation omitted].

86.	

Kokopenace SCC, supra note 14; R v Anderson, 2014 SCC 41, [2014] 2 SCR 167 [Anderson].

87.	

Sim, supra note 82 at para 19.

88.	

Ibid at paras 16–19

89.	

Ibid at para 15.

90.	

Gladue, supra note 1 at para 65, quoted in Sim, supra note 82 at para 15.

91.	

Sim, supra note 82 at para 16.

92.	
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although not evident from the reasoning, insofar as factors relevant to criminal sentencing (in
particular public safety) are relevant to the legal test being applied.93

B.

Frontenac Ventures Co v Ardoch Algonquin First Nation:
Civil Contempt

The Ontario Court of Appeal in Frontenac Ventures Co v Ardoch Algonquin First Nation
extended Gladue principles to sentencing for civil contempt. Justice MacPherson for the court
noted that the broader themes of Gladue, particularly alienation from the justice system, were
especially relevant in the context of this civil contempt for a blockade of lawful drilling:
Although Gladue was focused primarily on the serious problem of excessive
imprisonment of aboriginal peoples, the case in a broader sense draws
attention to the state of the justice system’s engagement with Canada’s First
Nations. I note three factors in particular that were highlighted in Gladue:
the estrangement of aboriginal peoples from the Canadian justice system, the
impact of years of dislocation and whether imprisonment would be meaningful
to the community of which the offender is a member. Those factors were all at
stake in this case.94
Justice MacPherson recognized the distinct purposes of civil and criminal contempt, specifically
that “the purpose of a sentence for criminal contempt is punishment, whereas the purpose of a
sentence for civil contempt is coercive or persuasive, designed to enforce the rights of a private
party.”95 However, this distinction had little impact because “the nature of the appellants’
conduct in repeatedly disobeying the interim and interlocutory injunctions came extremely
close to criminal contempt.”96
Thus, Frontenac Ventures most explicitly demonstrates the alienation contextual
approach, but also qualifies for the liberty interest approach. In contrast, the overlapping
considerations approach is downplayed by the distinction between the purposes of civil and
criminal contempt.
Frontenac Ventures also demonstrates the criminal conduct approach in its emphasis on
the fact that the conduct at issue was very close to criminal contempt. Under this approach,
Frontenac Ventures does not necessarily hold that Gladue principles apply to every sentencing
of an Indigenous person for civil contempt—they might apply only where the particular civil
contempt is close to criminal contempt.

C.

R v Robinson: Bail

Criminal Code, supra note 8, s 672.54: “When a court or Review Board makes a disposition…it shall,
taking into account the safety of the public, which is the paramount consideration, the mental condition of
the accused, the reintegration of the accused into society and the other needs of the accused, make one of
the following dispositions that is necessary and appropriate in the circumstances.”

93.	

Frontenac Ventures, supra note 83 at para 57.

94.	

Ibid at para 37 [citation omitted].

95.	

Ibid at para 37.

96.	
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Bail is arguably the easiest extension of Gladue principles, given that the Supreme Court
of Canada in Gladue explicitly identified bail as a reason for overincarceration of Indigenous
persons: “The unbalanced ratio of imprisonment for aboriginal offenders flows from a number
of sources.…It arises also from bias against aboriginal people and from an unfortunate
institutional approach that is more inclined to refuse bail and to impose more and longer
prison terms for aboriginal offenders.”97 In R v Robinson, Winkler CJO explicitly approved
the extension of Gladue principles to bail.98 His reasoning is relatively conclusory and does not
reveal which of my approaches he applied: “It is common ground that principles enunciated in
the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Gladue…have application to the question
of bail.”99 While other appellate courts have followed R v Robinson implicitly or explicitly,
they have not provided an analysis explaining why it was correctly decided.100
However, the context of bail demonstrates all four approaches that I have identified. Two
of these approaches obviously apply: the liberty interest approach, as the liberty interest of an
Indigenous person is engaged, and the criminal conduct approach, as the conduct at issue is,
by definition, criminal. The alienation contextual approach seems as applicable as in criminal
sentencing,101 although Winkler CJO did not explicitly invoke alienation or estrangement.
As for the overlapping considerations approach, the three grounds for refusing bail in the
Criminal Code overlap with the factors in criminal sentencing, particularly public safety under
the secondary ground.102

Gladue, supra note 1 at para 65 [emphasis added]. See also Rogin, supra note 79 at 354: “Gladue mandates
a return to first principles of the law of bail in recognition of the crisis facing the bail system in Canada and
the ways it might impact Aboriginal people.”

97.	

R v Robinson, supra note 84, Winkler CJO. See also Rogin, supra note 79 at 333 (criticizing the reasoning
in R v Robinson at 332 and 334) and 332: “Courts have found that the above [Gladue] principles are
applicable to bail hearings in a number of disparate and contradictory ways, presenting a piecemeal
approach to the application of Gladue to bail that lacks cohesion.” But see also Rogin at 336: “The
fact that R v Gladue and Ipeelee have been found to apply outside of sentencing should not mean that
sentencing principles are to be applied inappropriately without regard to the different legal contexts.”

98.	

R v Robinson, supra note 84 at para 13. For stronger language criticizing the reasons in R v Robinson,
see R v Heathen, 2018 SKPC 29 at para 12: “there is literally no analysis at all. There is simply the bald
statement that Gladue applies.”

99.	

R v Oakes, 2015 ABCA 178 at para 11 explicitly follows R v Robinson, as does R v Hope, 2016 ONCA
648 at paras 8–12, 133 OR (3d) 154 (see Rogin, supra note 79 at 333) and R v Louie, 2019 BCCA 257 at
para 35. R v Whitebear, 2018 ABCA 300 at para 7, while not mentioning R v Robinson, does accept that
Gladue principles apply to bail but without providing an analysis.

100.	

See, for example, Rich v Her Majesty the Queen, 2009 NLTD 69 at para 18, 286 Nfld & PEIR 346 [Rich]:
“Gladue focused on sentencing principles, but it talked about other issues that are relevant to bail: the
estrangement of aboriginal peoples from the Canadian justice system, the impact of years of dislocation,
whether imprisonment would be meaningful to the community of which the offender is a member, overrepresentation of members of the aboriginal community in prisons, overuse of incarceration and other
concerns unique to aboriginal communities. These types [of] factors are all relevant to bail hearings.” See
also R v Magill, 2013 YKTC 8 at para 46, [2013] YJ No 127 (QL): “In terms of how Gladue should inform
a bail court’s consideration of the tertiary ground, I think that the hypothetical reasonable person whose
views we are considering is also one that is apprised of the backdrop against which Aboriginal people come
to appear before criminal courts. This means an awareness of the history of colonialism, dislocation and
residential schools that Gladue and Ipeelee describe. This also means a recognition of the responsibility
that the Canadian government must assume in addressing the harm that has been occasioned.”

101.	

Criminal Code, supra note 8, s 515(10)(b): “where the detention is necessary for the protection or safety of
the public, including any victim of or witness to the offence, or any person under the age of 18 years.”

102.	
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United States v Leonard: Extradition

In United States v Leonard, the Ontario Court of Appeal extended Gladue principles to
the extradition context. Justice Sharpe for the court noted that Gladue principles were relevant
to one criterion in the legal test for extradition, “the severity of the sentence the accused is
likely to receive in each jurisdiction.”103 This demonstrates the overlapping considerations
approach—the result of the criteria for criminal sentencing is itself a consideration. The
criminal conduct approach also clearly applies, as the conduct for which extradition is sought
is also, by definition, criminal. Justice Sharpe also quoted with approval the alienation language
from Gladue.104 However, Sharpe JA emphasized what I have described as the liberty interest
approach, holding that Gladue applied whenever a liberty interest was engaged in criminal or
“related proceedings”:
The jurisprudence that I have already reviewed indicates that the Gladue
factors are not limited to criminal sentencing but that they should be
considered by all “decision-makers who have the power to influence the
treatment of aboriginal offenders in the justice system” (Gladue, at para
65) whenever an Aboriginal person’s liberty is at stake in criminal and
related proceedings.105
Indeed, the panel in LSUC v Robinson acknowledged that the engagement of a liberty interest
is one unifying factor of previous extensions of Gladue principles.106 Leonard leaves open,
however, the scope of “related proceedings” and whether engagement of the liberty interest is
necessary, not just sufficient, for the application of Gladue principles.
This liberty interest approach is also supported by the work of L Jane McMillan, who
suggests that “Gladue principles should be applied to all areas of the criminal justice system in
which an Aboriginal offender’s liberty is at stake.”107 Similarly, Kelsey L. Sitar states that “the
Gladue principles are relevant and worthy of consideration any time an Aboriginal offender
risks losing his or her liberty and/or comes into contact with the justice system.”108 (Sitar’s

Leonard, supra note 85 at para 84, quoting from United States of America v Cotroni; United States of
America v El Zein, [1989] 1 SCR 1469 at 1498–1499, 48 CCC (3d) 193.
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Leonard, supra note 85 at para 51, quoting Gladue, supra note 1 at para 88.
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Leonard, supra note 85 at para 85, quoted in LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42 at para 71
[emphasis added].
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LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42 at para 71. See also Dann, supra note 79: “[Leonard] confirms that
the application of Gladue principles extends beyond sentencing and should be considered whenever an
Aboriginal person’s liberty is at stake in criminal and related proceedings.” See also Manikis, supra note
17 at 183, defining Gladue as “the principle that requires public agencies to take into account the status of
Aboriginal people and their backgrounds when making decisions that can affect their liberty interests.” See,
for example, Roach, supra note 79 at 474: “The Ontario Court of Appeal has emerged as the leader among
courts of appeal in extending the reach of Gladue and in being sensitive to the need to apply its principles
to all detention decisions regarding Aboriginal offenders” [emphasis added].
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See, for example L Jane McMillan, “Living Legal Traditions: Mi’kmaw Justice in Nova Scotia” (2016) 67
UNB LJ 187 at 201, n 38. This approach is also demonstrated in Marie Manikis’s argument that Gladue
principles are a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter: Manikis, supra note 17.
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addition of “comes into contact with the justice system” arguably transcends the engagement
of the liberty interest.)
Subsequent to LSUC v Robinson, LaForme JA in Kokopenace explained Leonard,
alongside Sim and Frontenac Ventures, by applying what I have described as an alienation
contextual approach:
In recent years, this court has come to the recognition that the Gladue
principles properly extend beyond sentencing for criminal offences, and that
Gladue’s underlying philosophy bears on other aspects of the interaction
between Aboriginal peoples and the justice system.…This extension was
implicit in the recognition in Gladue, at para 65, and Ipeelee, at para 61,
that sentencing innovation alone would not solve the greater alienation of
aboriginal people from the criminal justice system.109
This emphasis of the alienation contextual approach is, of course, not necessarily contradictory
to the liberty interest approach. It merely reflects a difference in emphasis.
Thus, of these four approaches, the most recently and explicitly emphasized are the
liberty interest approach in Leonard and the alienation contextual approach in the reasons of
LaForme JA in Kokopenace.

E.

R v Kokopenace and R v Anderson: Has the Supreme Court of
Canada Restricted these Approaches?

A test for the extension of Gladue principles to contexts beyond criminal sentencing must
also account for the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Kokopenace and R v
Anderson. As Alexandra Hebert has noted, “the Supreme Court has been reluctant to apply
Gladue principles beyond the sentencing stage.”110
The decision in R v Kokopenace appears to qualify or pull back both from the proposition
that Gladue principles apply wherever Indigenous alienation from the justice system is relevant
and from the proposition that they apply wherever the liberty interest of an Indigenous person
is engaged. The Supreme Court in Kokopenace reversed the Ontario Court of Appeal’s holding
that the process by which jury rolls were generated inexcusably minimized the opportunities
for Indigenous people to serve as jurors, constituting a violation of the accused’s rights
under sections 11(d) and 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.111 While
all three judges on the Court of Appeal panel wrote separate reasons, even the dissenting

Kokopenace CA, supra note 14 at paras 142–143. See also Twins, supra note 86 at para 57: “The common
thread underlying all these decisions [Gladue, supra note 1, Ipeelee, supra note 14, Sim, supra note 82, and
Rich, supra note 101] is a recognition of the systemic and background factors that have contributed to the
over-incarceration of Aboriginal peoples in Canada and to what has been described as the estrangement of
Aboriginal peoples from the Canadian justice system.”
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Alexandra Hebert, “Change in Paradigm or Change in Paradox? Gladue Report Practices and Access to
Justice” (2017) 43:1 Queen’s LJ 149 at 173.
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The Crown did not attempt to establish justification of the infringement under section 1 of the Charter:
Kokopenace CA, supra note 14 at para 18.
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judge held that sections 11(d) and 11(f) were engaged, merely disagreeing that they were
violated on the facts.112
At the Court of Appeal, LaForme JA had emphasized the failure of Gladue, and Gladue
principles, in solving Indigenous overincarceration and alienation from the criminal justice
system.113 (While Goudge JA provided concurring reasons, these reasons neither adopted nor
rejected the observations by LaForme JA on Indigenous alienation from the justice system.114)
Implicit in this emphasis was the imperative for courts to use all available tools to remedy
that alienation.
Nonetheless, faced with this cri-de-coeur from the country’s most senior Indigenous
judge, the majority at the Supreme Court of Canada adopted, with only conclusory reasoning,
a minimalist and fixed interpretation of the rights at issue. Justice Moldaver, writing for the
majority, held that “the right to a representative jury is an entitlement held by the accused that
promotes the fairness of his or her trial, in appearance and in reality. It is not a mechanism for
repairing the damaged relationship between particular societal groups and our criminal justice
system more generally—and it should not be tasked with that responsibility.”115 Indeed, the
majority specifically asserted, virtually without explanation, that “the honour of the Crown
and Gladue principles should not have been considered because neither is relevant to the state’s
obligation to make reasonable efforts to compile the jury roll using random selection from
lists that draw from a broad cross-section of society and deliver jury notices to those who have
been randomly selected.”116 Thus, the majority asserted that “by relying on the honour of the
Crown and Gladue principles, the majority transformed the accused’s s 11 Charter rights into a
vehicle for repairing the long-standing rupture between Aboriginal groups and Canada’s justice
system”—without explaining why section 11 is not and should not be transformed into such
a vehicle.117 Similarly, Karakatsanis J’s concurring reasons stated that section 11 was not the
“correct constitutional tool.…It is beyond the scope of an accused’s fair trial rights as protected
by s 11(d) and (f) of the Charter to require the state to address issues that may cause segments
of the population to disengage from the justice system.…Other tools must be brought to bear
to resolve these problems.”118
To his credit, Cromwell J, writing in dissent for himself and McLachlin CJ, observed
that “while there are many deeply seated causes which contribute to Aboriginal underrepresentation on jury rolls, the Charter in my view ought to be read as providing an impetus
for change, not an excuse for saying that the remedy lies elsewhere.”119 More importantly,
he explicitly held that the majority’s approach was contrary to Gladue, although framing the
issue as discrimination as opposed to alienation more broadly: “To ignore racial discrimination
against Aboriginal people in the context of assembling a jury roll would be in marked contrast

Ibid at para 334, Rouleau JA.
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Ibid at paras 135–144.
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Ibid at paras 233–277.
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Kokopenace SCC, supra note 14 at para 1, Moldaver J for the majority.
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Ibid at para 98, Moldaver J for the majority. The honour of the Crown is an important legal concept but is
beyond the scope of this article.
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Ibid 14 at para 101, Moldaver J for the majority
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to the approach that this Court has taken to racial discrimination against Aboriginal people
in relation to sentencing Aboriginal offenders.”120 (Indeed, Tim Quigley has noted that “the
disproportional incarceration rate of Aboriginal people dealt with in Gladue and Ipeelee is at
least as, if not more, intractable than the unrepresentativeness of the jury roll in this case.”121)
This minimalist and fixed interpretation of rights by Moldaver J has rightfully attracted
criticism elsewhere. As Quigley has argued, the majority ignored the social and legal context
and the government’s role in its creation and perpetuation:
The majority position is a weak and timid response to serious constitutional
claims.…the majority in Kokopenace adamantly refused to consider the
sad legacy of colonialism and estrangement that the Aboriginal population
of Canada has suffered and how this might have had a bearing on the
disillusionment with and disengagement from the criminal justice system
by this segment of our population. Instead, Moldaver J has absolved
the state for any responsibility for this state of affairs. In the majority
view, the unwillingness of Aboriginal on-reserve residents to respond
to jury questionnaires and become available for jury duty is their
responsibility alone.122
Similarly, Julian Falconer states that “the more troubling message sent by the majority
opinion is that the alienation of First Nations peoples from the justice system is not actually a
legal problem.”123
In contrast, the dissent has garnered praise. Quigley concludes that “it is commendable,
therefore, that at least the dissenting justices drew a comparison with their own jurisprudence
in R v Gladue and R v Ipeelee and conducted a lengthy analysis of the role of the state in the
underrepresentation of Aboriginal residents in this case.”124 Similarly, Falconer writes that “the
dissent recognized that failure to consider the state’s historical relationship with Aboriginal
peoples, including the distressing social issues that many First Nations communities now face
as a result, detracts significantly from any analysis of Aboriginal rights in the justice system.”125
Kokopenace is jarringly inconsistent with previous jurisprudence from the Supreme Court
of Canada. As Falconer puts it, “we can only hope that the Kokopenace judgment becomes
an anomaly in the context of a Court which, in recent years, has a well-earned reputation for

Ibid at para 284, Cromwell J, dissenting.
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Tim Quigley, “Kokopenace: Charter Rights to Jury Representation for Aboriginal Accused Are Obliterated
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adjudicating Aboriginal rights claims in a sensitive and respectful fashion.”126 Kokopenace
is especially jarring in its rejection of Gladue principles, particularly because three of the
four approaches I have identified would seem to apply. While the overlapping considerations
approach would not seem to apply, the liberty interest and criminal conduct approaches
apply, as the defendant’s liberty interest is engaged by the composition of the jury roll and
the conduct at issue is criminal. More fundamentally, the alienation contextual approach is
dominant: Indigenous underrepresentation on jury rolls constitutes both a symptom and an
exacerbation of Indigenous alienation from the Canadian justice system. The holding that
section 11 of the Charter cannot address alienation, and thus Gladue principles cannot apply,
seems to be entirely sui generis and reveals no connection to existing case law on the extension
of Gladue. The most that can be drawn from Kokopenace is that Gladue principles do not
apply to jury roll composition, albeit for poorly articulated and essentially assumed reasons
about the nature of section 11 of the Charter.
Following Kokopenace, the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Anderson declined to apply
Gladue principles to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Justice Moldaver for the court
held that Gladue principles do not apply to a Crown prosecutor’s decision to tender a notice
in impaired driving cases, which notice serves to increase the mandatory minimum sentence,
and that that decision falls within prosecutorial discretion.127 In doing so, Moldaver J held
that Gladue principles apply to the judge but not to the prosecutor.128 (Justice Moldaver
clarified that, while the minister’s surrender decision in Leonard would appear to constitute
prosecutorial discretion, Gladue principles applied in Leonard only because the surrender
decision “requires the Minister of Justice to compare the likely sentence that would be imposed
in a foreign state with the likely sentence that would be imposed in Canada—a task which is
impossible to do without reference to the Gladue principles.”129)
Anderson is perhaps more understandable—or at least predictable—than Kokopenace
given how strictly Canadian courts protect prosecutorial discretion. As Marie Manikis has
noted, “the conclusion in Anderson is not surprising given the larger Canadian trend towards
protecting prosecutorial power and decision-making from judicial oversight.”130 Anderson
is nonetheless unfortunate. Prosecutorial decision making obviously plays a major role in
Indigenous overincarceration, and to rule that whole realm of decisions off limits (absent abuse
of process) is to limit, as in Kokopenace, the tools by which Indigenous alienation from the
justice system can be addressed.131 Given that all four of my approaches apply to Anderson,
Anderson is perhaps best understood as stating that Gladue principles will not apply to
prosecutorial discretion.132
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It remains unclear how these interpretations in Kokopenace and Anderson will impact the
extension of Gladue principles going forward.133 While all of my four approaches applied to
Anderson and three to Kokopenace, the court in those cases rejected the extension of Gladue
principles. Thus, these four approaches cannot be universally sufficient even in combination
for the extension of Gladue principles—and, if they are potentially sufficient in combination,
there will be as-yet-unarticulated exceptions, like prosecutorial discretion. Indeed, the Supreme
Court of Canada has stunted and implicitly questioned this line of cases without providing
guidance to appellate and trial courts.

III

A LEGAL TEST FOR THE EXTENSION OF GLADUE
PRINCIPLES BEYOND CRIMINAL SENTENCING

In this section I consider whether these four approaches, alone or in combination,
constitute a test for the extension of Gladue principles. I then apply them to the context of
lawyer discipline.
As I noted above, the appellate case law demonstrates that these four approaches may be
overlapping and not mutually exclusive, but the Supreme Court of Canada decisions mean
that they are not sufficient in combination. The analytical question remains: Should each
of the four approaches be necessary or sufficient for Gladue principles to apply? Does one
predominate? Most important to evaluating whether LSUC v Robinson was and remains
correctly decided is whether the liberty interest approach is overriding, such that an Indigenous
person’s liberty interest must be engaged for Gladue principles to apply. Furthermore, the
criminal conduct approach suggests that the scope of LSUC v Robinson may be narrow,
applying only to criminal conduct or near-criminal conduct. I also consider, following the
possibility acknowledged in Willier, whether Gladue principles apply to costs awards in
disciplinary proceedings.
As I have described, one approach to the application of Gladue principles is the liberty
interest approach, which holds that Gladue principles apply where an Indigenous person’s
liberty interest is engaged. This approach is clearest in the reasoning of Sharpe JA in Leonard:
“Gladue factors are not limited to criminal sentencing…they should be considered…whenever
an Aboriginal person’s liberty is at stake in criminal and related proceedings.”134 This language
raises the question of whether a liberty interest is necessary for Gladue principles to apply—
that is, whether Gladue principles apply if and only if a liberty interest is engaged. Similarly,
Manikis’s argument that Gladue principles are a principle of fundamental justice135 prompts

I note, however, that the Yukon Court of Appeal has explicitly relied on Anderson, supra note 87, and
its restrictive interpretation of Leonard, supra note 85, to decline to require judges to consider Gladue
factors in the calculation of enhanced credit under s 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, supra note 8, and in
rejecting the sentencing judge’s conclusion that “penal legislation that disallows any consideration of an
individual’s Aboriginal status is constitutionally flawed, offends the principles of fundamental justice and
can only be considered to have a grossly disproportionate impact on Aboriginal offenders”: R v Chambers,
2014 YKCA 13 at paras 81–87, 89 [quotation is from 89], 316 CCC (3d) 44. (This is despite the fact that
Anderson distinguished the role of the prosecutor from the role of the judge.)
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the question of whether they are, for the purposes of constitutional law, only a principle of
fundamental justice.
The liberty interest approach is appealing but inherently flawed as a test for the extension
of Gladue principles. Admittedly, the liberty interest approach neatly collects and simply
explains the leading appellate decisions, other than Kokopenace and Anderson. It is explicit in
the language of Sharpe JA and in some of the literature,136 and it is explicitly acknowledged
in LSUC v Robinson.137 Kokopenace and Anderson can perhaps be distinguished as outliers
or exceptional cases on the particular strength of prosecutorial discretion and the particular
(and peculiar) narrowness of jury composition rights under the Charter. Moreover, the liberty
interest approach is simple and clear in its application. However, there is nothing in the
reasoning of Sharpe JA in Leonard to suggest that Gladue principles cannot apply where the
liberty interest is not engaged, or that that was his intention. Indeed, if he had purported to
decide that Gladue principles apply only where the liberty interest is engaged, that holding
would have been obiter, as that question was not at issue on the facts of the case.138 That is,
while the liberty interest is descriptive of the past appellate case law on Gladue, it should not
be considered proscriptive of future extensions of Gladue.
Moreover, to recognize the liberty interest as controlling unduly narrows the scope
and potential of Gladue. The Supreme Court of Canada in Gladue was concerned about
Indigenous overincarceration not only in itself but also as a symptom of the broader alienation
of Indigenous persons from the justice system: “The excessive imprisonment of aboriginal
people is only the tip of the iceberg insofar as the estrangement of the aboriginal peoples
from the Canadian criminal justice system is concerned.”139 Thus, the alienation contextual
approach is the most purposive. Moreover, it is the one most evident in the appellate case
law discussed above, especially in the reasoning of LaForme JA in Kokopenace grouping Sim,
Frontenac Ventures, and Leonard. It is in this respect that the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision in Kokopenace is most jarring and, indeed, inconsistent with a purposive reading of
Gladue that recognizes that all possible tools must be used to address all aspects of this crisis.
An alienation contextual approach to the extension of Gladue principles to lawyer discipline
in LSUC v Robinson reflects the fact that Indigenous lawyers are both Indigenous people
who are alienated from the justice system and the people whose work mitigates the alienation
of Indigenous peoples more generally. Under this alienation contextual approach, LSUC v
Robinson correctly stands for the proposition that Gladue principles apply to any discipline of
Indigenous lawyers.
As with the liberty interest approach, to recognize the criminal conduct approach
as controlling would unduly narrow the scope and potential of Gladue, as well as being
inconsistent with the reasoning in LSUC v Robinson. Any professional misconduct or conduct
unbecoming, even if it does not constitute criminal or near-criminal conduct, engages to some
extent the alienation of Indigenous lawyers from the justice system.
From a black-letter-law perspective, the overlapping considerations approach seems most
appropriate. It fulfils doctrinal consistency, a major ambition of the common law. But the

See above notes 107 and 108 and accompanying text.
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approach that is most purposive and true to the text and spirit of Gladue is the alienation
contextual approach. Under both of these approaches, Gladue principles properly apply to the
discipline of Indigenous lawyers generally.
However, since none of these four approaches explain Kokopenace and Anderson, there
would need to be exceptions—although it is not yet clear what the criteria for those exceptions
are. I have suggested that the ardent protection of prosecutorial discretion and the narrowness
of section 11 of the Charter are the best explanations at present.
An alternative is a multifactorial test: That is, Gladue principles are more likely to
apply where the applicable legal test includes considerations that overlap with criminal law
sentencing, where the alienation of Canada’s Indigenous peoples from the justice system is
relevant, where the liberty interest of an Indigenous person is engaged, and where the conduct
at issue constitutes criminal or near-criminal conduct. The more approaches that apply, the
more likely it is that Gladue principles are relevant, but none of the four are determinative
in themselves. This test is versatile but is precarious (indeed, one might say meaningless) and
provides unpredictable results.
There is a pressing need for appellate direction specifying which of these approaches
should apply and clarifying the nature of the exceptions applicable in Kokopenace and
Anderson. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada (with respect) has left appellate and trial
courts with little to no indication of when Gladue principles are properly extended beyond
criminal sentencing. It is thus incumbent on that court to clarify the situation, and it falls to
appellate courts to proceed as best they can until such clarification is provided. The alienation
contextual approach is most consistent with Gladue and the existing appellate case law and
should be explicitly adopted by appellate courts and followed, in the meantime, by lower
courts and tribunals.

A.

Application to Lawyer Discipline

Having identified approaches that appellate courts have applied to the extension of Gladue
principles beyond the criminal sentencing context, and having considered those approaches as
candidate tests or elements of a test for the extension of Gladue principles, I now apply these
approaches and tests to the specific context of lawyer discipline.
Gladue principles would apply to the professional discipline of Indigenous lawyers
generally under the overlapping considerations approach or the alienation contextual
approach. Gladue principles are applicable under the overlapping considerations approach
because the relevant considerations in professional discipline overlap with those of criminal
sentencing. Recall from Part I that, while law society discipline does not share the criminal law
purpose of punishment, it does share the purpose of the protection of the public.140 Moreover,
many factors are common to both criminal sentencing and disciplinary penalties, including the
severity of the conduct, the impact on the victim, and general and specific deterrence.141 Gladue
principles are also applicable under the alienation contextual approach because the alienation

See above notes 45 to 48 and accompanying text; Criminal Code, supra note 8, s 718, esp s 718(e).
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of Indigenous peoples from the justice system, including the alienation of Indigenous lawyers,
is relevant to the discipline of Indigenous lawyers.
Under these two approaches, LSUC v Robinson and Batstone were correctly decided.
Most explicit in the reasons in LSUC v Robinson is the overlapping considerations approach:
the applicable legal test includes considerations that overlap with criminal law sentencing,
specifically culpability, character, and mitigating and aggravating factors. Although alienation is
not emphasized as expressly in the reasons, LSUC v Robinson also demonstrates the alienation
contextual approach: the lawyer felt unable to turn to the police for assistance.142 The reasons
of the panel in Batstone were brief on the application of Gladue, but their reference to “the
history of Aboriginal people in Canada and the ongoing effects of colonialism and racism”
demonstrates the alienation contextual approach.143
In contrast, under the liberty interest approach Gladue principles would not apply because,
as the appeal panel explicitly recognized in LSUC v Robinson, the lawyer’s liberty interest was
not engaged.144 Under this approach, LSUC v Robinson and Batstone were incorrectly decided.
Under the criminal conduct approach, Gladue principles would apply to lawyer discipline
only where the misconduct at issue constituted or approached criminal conduct. Under this
approach, LSUC v Robinson was correctly decided—assault is a criminal offence, for which
the lawyer was convicted—but should not have been followed in Batstone, as practising while
suspended is not a criminal offence or near-criminal offence (although it is a provincial offence,
albeit one for which imprisonment is not an available penalty).145
Under the multifactorial test, which combines all four approaches, it is possible but not
obvious that Gladue principles apply to professional discipline of Indigenous lawyers, and thus
that LSUC v Robinson or Batstone, or both, were correctly decided.
I acknowledge here the concern that Gladue principles may have inadvertent negative
impacts in the criminal context where victims of violence are particularly vulnerable, and thus
I leave open the possibility that in some specific circumstances of professional misconduct or
conduct unbecoming by Indigenous lawyers, Gladue principles should not be applied or should
be applied cautiously. The National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women
and Girls “call[ed] upon federal, provincial, and territorial governments to thoroughly evaluate
the impacts of Gladue principles and section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code on sentencing
equity as it relates to violence against Indigenous women, girls and 2SLGBTQQIA people.”
146
In parallel, where an Indigenous lawyer’s conduct has harmed Indigenous persons and
especially Indigenous women and LGBTQ+ persons, and the future ability of the lawyer to
practise poses danger to Indigenous persons and especially Indigenous women and LGBTQ+
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persons’ confidence in the legal profession, Gladue principles should not be applied or should
be applied cautiously.
What about costs? The panel in Willier recognized that Gladue principles could potentially
apply to costs awards in lawyer discipline. As with disciplinary penalties themselves, the
lawyer’s liberty interest is not engaged, such that Gladue principles do not apply under the
liberty interest approach. Unlike disciplinary penalties, it is unclear if Gladue principles apply
under the overlapping purposes approach, as there is disagreement in the case law about the
purpose of costs in disciplinary proceedings.147 In Ontario, “the general purpose and governing
principle of the consideration of costs and who should bear them is that the financial burden
of an investigation should not rest on the Society, generally, and its members,”148 which would
suggest that the factors in assessing costs are different than the factors in assessing penalty.
However, there is case law from British Columbia suggesting that costs share the purpose of
deterrence.149 As for the alienation contextual approach, costs awards appear to have less to do
with alienation from the justice system than do disciplinary penalties themselves.150
While the impact of Gladue principles in LSUC v Robinson and Batstone was to reduce
the length of a suspension (LSUC v Robinson) and to substitute a reprimand for a suspension
(Batstone), and as contemplated in Willier was to reduce the amount of a costs order, the
emphasis in Gladue on “alternative sanctions” may lead panels to more often consider
remedies such as restitution, where permitted by their enabling legislation.151
I ultimately conclude that the alienation contextual approach is most appropriate. Thus,
LSUC v Robinson and Batstone were correctly decided. The applicability of Gladue principles
to costs orders, as contemplated in Willier, is less clear.
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CONCLUSION

In this article, I have argued that Gladue principles properly apply to lawyer discipline.
I have done so by analyzing the leading appellate decisions extending Gladue principles beyond
criminal sentencing and separating out four potential approaches:
1. The overlapping considerations approach, where the applicable legal test includes
considerations or purposes or factors that overlap with criminal law sentencing
2. The alienation contextual approach, where the alienation of Canada’s
Indigenous peoples from the justice system, and particularly the criminal justice
system, is relevant
3. The liberty interest approach, where the liberty interest of an Indigenous
person is engaged
4. The criminal conduct approach, where the conduct at issue constitutes criminal or
near-criminal conduct.
I concluded that the approach most true to Gladue is alienation contextual: Gladue principles
apply whenever the alienation of Indigenous persons from the justice system is relevant, with
as-yet-unspecified exceptions to account for Kokopenace and Anderson. Under this approach,
or the overlapping considerations approach, Gladue principles would generally apply to
professional discipline of Indigenous lawyers.
The legal community would benefit greatly from appellate direction specifying which of
these approaches should apply, whether alone or in combination, and clarifying the nature
of the exceptions applicable in Kokopenace and Anderson. Pending such direction, Gladue
principles properly apply to lawyer discipline: LSUC v Robinson is binding for hearing panels
in Ontario and persuasive in the other Canadian jurisdictions. While it can be read narrowly
to apply only where the conduct at issues constitutes criminal or near-criminal conduct,
a broader reading that applies it to all discipline of Indigenous lawyers is more consistent
with Gladue itself.
The extension of Gladue principles to the professional discipline of Indigenous lawyers
is consistent with the case law as it has developed since Gladue. More fundamentally, this
extension is consistent with the rallying cry in Gladue and Ipeelee, echoed by LaForme JA in
Kokopenace, to address the alienation of Canada’s Indigenous people from the justice system.
In the meantime, and in the face of this doctrinal uncertainty in the case law, there are
other steps that can be taken to ensure or promote the use of Gladue principles in the discipline
of Indigenous lawyers. Given that codes of conduct and legislation on the legal profession both
say little about disciplinary penalty determination (in contrast, for example, to the sentencing
provisions in the Criminal Code), it would be inconsistent and incongruous to add provisions
on Gladue principles to those—although the law societies and the legislatures are free to do
so. Likewise, purporting to issue binding directives to law society disciplinary panels (and in
Ontario the Law Society Tribunal) could raise independence concerns. The most appropriate
solution would be for law societies to adopt policies requiring or guidelines encouraging their
disciplinary prosecutors to take the position that Gladue principles are applicable.
Discipline is not the determinative or even predominating component of professional
regulation. Nonetheless, it cannot be overlooked as law societies, the legal profession, and
the legal academy work toward reconciliation. The extension of Gladue principles to lawyer
discipline is an appropriate step and an important component in re-evaluating the relationship
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between law societies and Indigenous lawyers. While this is not to say that other steps will not
be necessary,152 this extension is a moderate and incremental one. The alienation of Indigenous
peoples from the Canadian legal system includes the alienation of Indigenous lawyers from
the legal system and specifically from its regulators. Indigenous lawyers will be central to
addressing alienation, and that centrality cannot be ignored if reconciliation is to be attainable
or successful. Indeed, discipline in individual cases can have higher visibility and thus a
greater impact on public perception of the regulation of the legal profession than deliberate
public outreach.

Consider, for example, the inclusion of Indigenous members on discipline panels for Indigenous lawyers.
Here, see Coutlee (Re), 2018 LSBC 33, [2018] LSDD No 227, reconstituting a hearing panel to include an
Indigenous person. Contrast Law Society of Upper Canada v Bogue, 2018 ONLSTH 38, [2018] LSDD No
55, an unsuccessful motion for recusal of two of three non-Indigenous panel members, and Law Society
of Upper Canada v Bogue, 2018 ONLSTH 46, [2018] LSDD No 63, an unsuccessful motion seeking “an
Order appointing an Indigenous Chair to oversee an Indigenous Tribunal comprised of members of the
Indigenous community” (at para 3). Consider also the use of sentencing circles in penalty determination:
Law Society of Upper Canada v Robinson, 2012 ONLSHP 200, [2012] LSDD No 217.

152.	
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